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1. Introduction 
There exists a vast body of empirical research on the dividend behaviour of US and 
UK corporations. However, much less is known about the dividend policy of firms 
based elsewhere. The literature is even sparser on the link between dividends and 
control across the world. This is highly surprising given that theory predicts that there 
should be such a link.  
In addition to the absence of a large body of literature, the only two cross-country 
studies on the link between dividend policy and control – La Porta et al. (2000) and 
Faccio et al. (2001) – have both considerable limitations in terms of the measurement 
of corporate control. While La Porta et al. (2000) use the quality of law which is 
correlated with the average concentration of control in a country, they do not directly 
measure corporate control at the level of the individual firm. In contrast, Faccio et al. 
(2001) measure control at firm level. However, while they account for the fact that 
control over a firm may be held indirectly, via e.g. pyramids of ownership, they make 
the fairly strong assumption that any unlisted firm holding a stake in one of their 
sample firms is family controlled. Hence, their study likely overestimates the 
importance of family control in countries where other types of large shareholders also 
hold control indirectly. Our study suggests that Germany is one of these countries. In 
addition, neither study adjusts for the tax status of the controlling shareholder which 
may also affect the dividend payout. 
Our study purports to address these two limitations by investigating the impact of 
actual ultimate control as well as the tax status of the controlling shareholder on the 
dividend payout for the case of German firms during 1984-2005. Germany is a rich 
laboratory for the study of the effects of control on dividends as there are sizeable 
percentages of both firms with concentrated control in the hands of families, banks or 
other corporations and firms that are widely held. In contrast, given the dispersion of 
control in the UK and the US studies on those countries are typically only able to 
analyse the impact of managerial and relatively small institutional stock holdings on 
the dividend policy. In addition, our study also adjusts for country-specific 
characteristics that are normally omitted in cross-country studies. These  
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characteristics include the existence of guaranteed dividends on preference stock, so 
called ‘specially designated dividends’ and ‘control agreements’ that are frequently in 
place in firms controlled by other firms. Hence, if there is a link between control and 
dividend policy our study is well equipped to detect it. 
While we find that the concentration of control as such does not have an impact on the 
dividend payout, we find strong evidence that the type of controlling shareholder has 
an influence on the dividend. In particular, our results suggest that firms controlled by 
families have significantly higher dividend payouts while those controlled by banks 
have lower payouts than all other firms. This result persists even if we adjust for the 
tax status of the controlling shareholder. Surprisingly, family controlled firms pay 
higher dividends even though families have a preference for capital gains rather than 
dividends.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the link 
between control and dividend policy, discusses the German tax system and develops 
hypotheses on the impact of control, the type of controlling shareholder as well as the 
tax status of the latter on the dividend payout. Section 3 focuses on sample and other 
data issues as well as the measurement of control. The following section discusses the 
descriptive analysis. Sections 5 and 6 are about the multivariate analysis, focusing on 
the methodology and the estimation results, respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the relation between 
dividend policy and ownership and control. Based on this review, we develop a series 
of testable hypotheses about the impact on dividend policy of the concentration of 
control, the type of controlling shareholder and the tax preference for dividends of the 
controlling shareholder. 
2.1 The concentration of control 
The separation of ownership and control gives rise to an agency problem as the 
interests of the agent (manager) may diverge from those of the principal (provider of  
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finance) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). A high dividend payout ratio is then one way of 
mitigating the agency problem as it increases the likelihood that the firm has to raise 
outside financing on a regular basis, thereby subjecting itself to outside monitoring 
(Easterbrook 1984). According to Rozeff (1982), another way of reducing the agency 
problem is the monitoring performed by a large shareholder. This monitoring is likely 
to align the interests of the managers with those of the shareholders. Hence, 
concentrated ownership and control may reduce the need for dividends. In support of 
his prediction, Rozeff (1982) finds that firms have higher payout ratios when insiders 
hold a lower fraction of the equity and/or there is a greater number of shareholders. 
Several other studies (e.g. Crutchley and Hansen 1989, Dempsey and Laber 1992, 
Moh’d, Perry and Rimbey 1995) provide evidence consistent with Rozeff’s 
prediction.  
Easterbrook (1984) theorises that high dividends are used as a self-disciplining 
mechanism forcing the firm to raise outside equity, thereby facing the scrutiny of 
outsiders such as financial analysts and journalists. Born and Rimbey (1993) find 
support for this. Hence, concentrated control and high dividend payouts may be 
alternative monitoring mechanisms. This leads us to our first hypothesis. 
H1: There is a negative linear relationship between the dividend payout and the 
concentration of control. 
However, Morck et al. (1988) argue that, once control exceeds a certain threshold (the 
point of entrenchment), the controlling shareholder will have uncontested control and 
may be tempted to expropriate the minority shareholders. According to Schooley and 
Barney (1994), beyond this threshold there may be a need again for high dividends. In 
line with this argument, Schooley and Barney (1994), Hamid et al. (1995) and 
Crutchley et al. (1999) test whether there is a non-linear relationship between 
dividends and insider, i.e. management ownership. They find support for this in the 
form of a convex relationship between insider ownership and dividend yields. While 
the danger of minority shareholder expropriation is particularly severe in corporate 
governance systems such as Germany given the significant number of firms that are 
controlled by families or other large shareholders, Faccio et al. (2001) nevertheless 
find evidence that Western European firms, where expropriation of minority  
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shareholders is more likely, pay higher dividends than other firms. All of the above 
discussion suggests a non-linear relationship between control and the dividend payout 
and leads us to our second hypothesis. 
H2: The relationship between dividends and concentration of control is at first 
downward sloping over some initial range of control and then upward sloping. 
2.2 The type of controlling shareholder 
Whereas the above two hypotheses refer to control without taking into consideration 
the identity of the controlling shareholder, an emerging body of the literature deals 
with the impact of various types of large shareholder on dividend policy (e.g., Gugler 
2003, Perez-Gonzales 2003, Goergen et al. (2005) and Barclay et al. 2008). 
Distinguishing between the types of large shareholder may be important as different 
types are likely to provide different degrees of monitoring. In particular, it is worth 
distinguishing between the following three types of shareholder: families or 
individuals, banks and other corporations.  
A controlling stake in the hands of a family or individual rather than a corporation 
may give rise to the expropriation of minority shareholders. Connelly et al. (2010) 
review the empirical research on the influence of family shareholders on shareholder 
value. They find empirical support for the prediction that family shareholders 
expropriate minority shareholders. As a result, small shareholders may only be willing 
to invest in firms controlled by families or individuals if they receive a higher 
dividend payout. An alternative reason why firms controlled by families may pay 
higher dividends is the family’s liquidity needs. Dividends are a way for the family to 
generate “hard cash” without having to give up the control over their firm. 
H3: Firms controlled by families pay higher dividends. 
A second type of large shareholder is industrial and commercial corporations which in 
turn have their own shareholders. Therefore, they may themselves be subject to 
agency conflicts and be less effective monitors than other types of large shareholder. 
Hence, for such firms there may be a need for high dividends. 
H4: Firms controlled by other corporations have higher dividend payouts than firms 
controlled by other types of large shareholder.  
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Accounting for control by banks is particularly appropriate given the alleged 
corporate governance role played by banks in Germany. The traditional view 
presented inter alia by Correia da Silva et al. (2004) is that long-term relationships 
between firms and banks (in their role as creditors and owners of equity) alleviate 
agency costs and asymmetries of information between outside investors and 
managers. Hence, the need for costly dividends is likely to be lower in firms 
controlled by banks. 
However, the evidence as to the impact of bank monitoring and, in particular, the link 
between bank control and firm value remains inconclusive. For example, Chirinko 
and Elston (1996) do not find a robust positive effect of bank influence on 
profitability. Furthermore, while their study is the only one that investigates the 
impact of bank control on dividend policy, they do not find that bank influence has 
any effect on dividend policy. In contrast, Cable (1985) and Gorton and Schmid 
(2000) find a positive effect of bank involvement on financial performance. Hence, 
the evidence as to the impact of banks on dividends and performance is still out there. 
This leads us to our next hypothesis. 
H5: Bank control is associated with lower dividend payouts. 
Apart from their monitoring incentives, the types of large shareholder also differ in 
terms of their tax preference for dividends as compared to capital gains. We shall 
discuss the tax preference of the various types of shareholder in the following sub-
section.  
2.3 The tax preference for dividends of the controlling shareholder 
This sub-section describes the German tax system from 1977 until 2005 and 
determines the tax preference for dividends of the various types of shareholder. It also 
develops two hypotheses based on the tax status of family shareholders and corporate 
shareholders. 
Until the year 2000, Germany operated a split-rate corporate tax system under which 
retained profits were taxed more heavily than distributed profits (see Table 1). From 
1991 onwards, both retained and distributed profits were also subject to a so-called  
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‘solidarity surcharge’, which affected both tax rates equally.
1 Still, there was an 
additional tax on distributed profits (i.e., dividends): a 25 per cent withholding tax 
was deducted at source from the dividends paid to shareholders. However, both the 
corporate tax rate on distributed profits and the withholding tax (including the 
‘solidarity surcharge’) could be fully claimed by shareholders as a tax credit against 
their income tax liabilities. Hence, Germany operated a full imputation system of 
taxation until 2001.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The 2001 tax reform replaced the imputation system by the so-called ‘half-income 
system’ (‘Halbeinkünfteverfahren’). Retained profits and dividends are no longer 
taxed at different rates and now incur the same rate of 26.4 per cent (25% plus the 
‘solidarity surcharge’ of 5.5%, increasing the rate to 26.4%) at the corporate level. 
Formally, a gross dividend of Deutsch Mark (DM) 1 (including the tax credit received 
for corporate tax (plus the ‘solidarity surcharge’) on distributed earnings) was worth 
(1-ts) - tstss to an individual shareholder, where ts stands for the shareholder’s income 
tax rate and tss for the ‘solidarity surcharge’. The tax discrimination variable (for the 
period prior to 2001), measuring the preference of dividends over capital gains, is 
equal to: 
 
 
   
1
11
ss s s
r r ss g g ss
tt t
TAX
tt t tt t


 
 (1) 
where tr stands for the corporate tax on retained earnings, and tg for the capital gains 
tax rate. A shareholder has a preference for dividends over capital gains if the tax 
discrimination variable TAX exceeds 1. 
In what follows we examine the tax status of three types of large shareholder: (i) 
individuals (ii) corporations (i.e., industrial and commercial firms, as well as banks 
                                                 
1 The ‘solidarity surcharge’ (‘Solidaritätszuschlag’) is a surcharge on corporate and personal earnings 
and was introduced in order to meet the costs of the German reunification. The surcharge is currently 
5.5 per cent.  
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and insurance companies), and (iii) foreign investors. In addition, we also examine the 
tax status of firms that are widely held. 
(i) Individuals. The top tax rate on personal income (i.e., ts) in Germany varies from 
48.5 per cent to 56 per cent during 1977 and 2005 (see Table 1). There is no personal 
capital gains tax (i.e., tg = 0) provided that shares are held for a minimum period (i.e., 
6 months until 1998, and 12 months thereafter). For shares held for less than the 
minimum period, the realized capital gains are added to an individual’s taxable 
income. If we assume that the shares are held for at least one year, the tax 
discrimination variable reduces to: 
 
 
1
1
s ss s
rr s s
tt t
TAX
tt t



 (2)
 
Thus, the tax preference for dividends compared to capital gains depends on the 
marginal income tax bracket of the shareholder. Under the imputation system (i.e. 
before 2001), we need to consider two categories of individuals: 
a. Individuals whose marginal income tax rate is lower than the corporate tax rate 
on retained earnings and capital gains are not realized within 6 months (12 
months after 1998). This type of investor prefers dividends over capital gains. 
b. Individuals whose marginal income tax rate is above the corporate tax rate on 
retained earnings have a tax preference for long-term capital gains.  
Under the new system, one half of the dividend is taxed at 26.4 per cent as in previous 
years, and the other half is now taxed twice, at the personal and corporate level. 
Therefore, for individuals the effective tax rate exceeds the tax rate of 26.4 per cent 
incurred on retained earnings (see Table 1). Since capital gains are still tax-exempt 
(on stock held for more than 12 months), individuals prefer capital gains over 
dividends even if they are in the lowest tax bracket.
2 The tax discrimination variable 
for individuals is now as follows: 
 
      

1 1 0.5 1
1
dd s s dd s s s s s
rr s s
tt t tt t t t
TAX
tt t
  

  
(3) 
                                                 
2 The tax system changed again in 2009.  
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As controlling shareholders are wealthy individuals, their annual taxable income will 
most likely exceed DM 102,000 (the threshold in place for being taxed at the highest 
income tax rate at the end of our sample period). Consequently, domestic individuals 
are assumed to be taxed at the highest income tax rate (for details see Table 1). 
Furthermore, we assume that individuals hold their large share stakes for a long 
period of time (at least 12 months) such that capital gains tax, tg, is zero. Plugging 
these values into equations (2) and (3), we obtain that the tax discrimination variable 
(TAX) for this type of investor is always below 1. Hence, individuals prefer long-term 
capital gains over dividends. This discussion leads us to our first hypothesis on the 
effect of the tax status of the type of large shareholder on dividend policy. 
H6: Given the preference of families and individuals for capital gains, firms 
controlled by families or individuals have lower dividend payouts. 
(ii) Corporations. Before 2001, corporate investors (similar to individuals) received 
the dividend plus a credit which amounted to their corporate tax liability. 
Consequently, when receiving the dividend, they did not pay any tax. However, the 
dividend received increased their taxable income. Under the new system, dividend 
payments to corporations were tax-free until 2004. However since 2004, 5 per cent of 
the dividend payment have had to be declared as revenue and have therefore been 
subject to corporate tax. Since capital gains from the sale of shares held in another 
company are also tax-exempt under the new system, corporations are indifferent 
between retained and distributed earnings between 2001 and 2004 with a slight 
preference for capital gains thereafter. 
In order to obtain the income tax rate ts for corporations, we need to make an 
assumption on how profits in these (parent) firms are distributed. If all profits are 
distributed as dividends by the corporate shareholder, the tax rate on distributed 
earnings applies. In contrast, if all profits are retained, the corporation tax on retained 
earnings, tr, is applicable (see Table 1 for details). We assume that the average firm 
has a dividend payout ratio of 70 per cent (with published earnings as reference), 
roughly equal to the percentage of published earnings that German firms pay out as 
gross dividends (see Andres et al. 2009). Based on this assumption, the effective 
(weighted average) corporate tax rate for a firm is 42 per cent during the period up to  
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1989 [36%(70%)+56%(30%)]. Plugging these values into equation (1), we obtain a 
tax discrimination variable for corporations that is always larger than 1 for the period 
1984-2000. Thus, corporations have a strong tax preference for dividends during that 
period. From 2001 onwards, corporations are indifferent between capital gains and 
dividends. As dividends are sticky (Lintner 1956), it makes sense to argue that the 
high dividend payouts fuelled by corporations’ initial preference for dividends will 
not be reduced once corporations become indifferent between dividends and capital 
gains. 
H7: Firms controlled by corporations have higher dividend payouts than firms 
controlled by individuals. 
(iii) Foreign investors. As this type of investor is not entitled to a tax credit by the 
German fiscal authorities, it may be subject to double taxation which includes 
corporate tax on the earnings of the German firm and withholding tax on dividends as 
well as income tax in the investor’s home country.
3 Hence, the tax discrimination 
variable for foreign investors is:  
 
    
  
11
11
sf dd s s
gf rr s s
tt t t
TAX
tt t t
 

   (4) 
where tgf (tsf) stands for the tax rate on capital gains (income) in the foreign investor’s 
home country and td stands for the corporate tax on distributed earnings. Thus, the 
preference depends on the tax treatment by the investor’s home country and the 
existence of double taxation treaties. As it is not feasible to determine the tax status of 
each foreign investor in our sample firms, we ignore firm-year observations relating to 
control by foreign investors in our regression analysis.  
(iv) Widely held firms. As we do not have information on the individual shareholders 
of these firms, we use a weighted average tax discrimination variable. The aggregate 
weights are based on German surveys on share ownership (‘Gesamtwirtschaftliche 
Finanzierungsrechnung Deutsche Bundesbank’) and relate to the importance of 
various types of shareholder in the average listed German firm. For example in 1990, 
                                                 
3 The withholding tax of 25 per cent may be reduced by German double taxation treaties with other 
countries.  
  10
17 per cent of all the shares listed on the German stock exchanges were owned by 
individuals, 69 per cent by companies, and 14 per cent by foreign investors. We 
assume that the tax discrimination variable for foreign investors is 1 and the tax 
discrimination variables for corporations, local and federal government authorities, 
banks, and insurers is 2.0. Given that the tax discrimination variable for individuals is 
0.94 in 1990 (all computations are based on equation (1)), the weighted average tax 
discrimination variable for widely held firms amounts to 1.68 
(17%*0.94+69%*2.0+14%*1). 
3. Sample and Definitions 
3.1 Sample 
This study is based on a sample of 220 industrial and commercial firms over the 
twenty-two-year period from 1984 to 2005. All firms are quoted on at least one of the 
eight German stock exchanges. Thirty-six firms obtain a listing after the year 1984, 
but all sample firms are quoted in 1989.
4 Overall, the sample consists of an 
unbalanced panel of data, i.e. 3,932 firm-year observations (see Table 2). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Data are collected from Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer,
5 an annual publication 
which provides detailed company information, including balance sheet and profit and 
loss account items, historical data on equity raised, shareholdings, share prices, and 
the date of first quotation. The following data items are gathered from this source: 
earnings after tax, depreciation, changes in pension provisions and other provisions, 
dividends per share for both preference and ordinary shares, the number of ordinary 
and preference shares outstanding, as well as information on ownership of voting 
equity. The dividend-per-share figures are adjusted for stock splits. 
                                                 
4 Thirty-six firms leave the stock market and go private, sixteen go bankrupt, thirty-eight are taken over 
and twelve put in place a ‘control agreement’ during the period of analysis. 
5 The name Saling Aktienführer changed to Hoppenstedt Aktienführer in 1997 with the publication of 
the 90
th edition of the guide.  
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3.2 Definitions and data issues 
We use gross dividends, defined as cash dividends gross of corporation tax levied on 
dividend distributions, in our analysis. About 25 per cent of our sample (58 cases out 
of a total of 220) have preferred stock listed in at least one year during the period of 
1984-2005. Preference shares in Germany do not grant any voting rights, but offer a 
guaranteed dividend (normally a fixed percentage of the face value of the share). If 
the firm has sufficient earnings after tax, the holders of the preference shares will 
receive their guaranteed dividend. If after the payment of the guaranteed dividend, the 
firm still has earnings left, the holders of the ordinary shares will receive a (variable) 
dividend. Earnings permitting, the holders of the preference shares will then receive 
the equivalent amount paid to the ordinary shareholders, on top of the guaranteed 
dividend. If the guaranteed dividend has been carried over twice, then the preference 
shares receive a temporary voting right until the firm has paid the dividends 
outstanding. To account for the dividends on preferred stock, we calculate a weighted 
average of the dividend paid on ordinary and preference shares. The weights consist 
of the amount of share capital issued in the form of preference shares and ordinary 
shares, respectively, expressed as a proportion of the total market value of the total 
equity capital outstanding.
6  
In contrast to our approach, UK and US studies typically ignore dividends other than 
those paid on ordinary shares (see e.g., Bond et al. 1996, Edwards et al. 1986). 
However contrary to UK firms which always have their ordinary shares listed, some 
German firms only have their preference shares listed with all of the ordinary shares 
being held by the main shareholder, typically a family. Still, even for Germany, one 
may argue in favour of the exclusion of dividends on preferred equity, especially in 
the context of our panel of data, given that the dividends per share for the two classes 
of shares are perfectly correlated for virtually all of our sample firms. Indeed, for only 
13 German firms (out of the 58 with preference shares) the change in the dividend per 
                                                 
6 Hence, the weighted average dividend per share is calculated as follows. Let NT be the total number 
of shares outstanding, No the number of ordinary shares, and Np the number of preference shares. Thus, 
NT = No+Np. Moreover, let DPSo be the dividend per share paid on ordinary shares, and DPSp the 
dividend per share paid on preference shares. The weighted average dividend per share (WDPS) is then 
equal to WDPS = (DPS0xN0+DPSpxNp)/NT.  
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ordinary share is different from that in the dividend per preference share. 
Furthermore, differences are only observed in the case of dividend omissions and 
dividend initiations, reflecting the fact that preference shares give rise to a guaranteed 
dividend. While our data suggest that changes in the dividends earned on both types 
of shares are highly correlated, we still opt for the inclusion of dividends on 
preference shares. However, our results are qualitatively similar if dividends on 
preference shares are excluded. 
Another peculiarity of the German system is the high incidence of ‘specially 
designated dividends’. We observe such special dividends for 343 of the 3,932 firm-
year observations, i.e. 9 per cent of the whole sample. These special dividends 
predominantly reflect one-off payouts of excess cash to the shareholders. Brickley 
(1983), who studies special dividends paid by US corporations, also finds that these 
are motivated by the desire to return cash to the shareholders. For 44 firm-years, we 
observe large one-off payments associated with ‘special anniversaries’, sales of 
subsidiaries, or distributions of reserves previously accumulated at a different rate of 
taxation. The fundamental problem with these 343 large payments is one of timing as 
it is not clear which accounting year(s) these payments should be allocated to. As we 
do not have enough information allowing us to allocate these payments to specific 
accounting years, we decide to exclude these payments. 
Finally, some quoted German companies have so called ‘control agreements’ with 
their parent company. There are two such types of agreements: a Profit and Loss 
Agreement (PLA) and a Subordination of Management Agreement (SMA).
7 An SMA 
requires the controlling company to absorb any losses, but the transfer of profits is 
optional. A PLA implies a transfer of both profits and losses to the controlling 
company. Hence, the question arises as to whether companies with such agreements 
should be included in this study. We decide to exclude these firms from our analysis 
for two reasons. First, the main benefit from these control contracts for the parent is to 
carry forward possible tax losses generated by the subsidiary. The parent can then 
absorb these losses and offset them against its profits in order to reduce its tax bill. 
                                                 
7 Both agreements require the approval of at least 75 per cent of the voting capital represented at the 
general meetings of both the controlling company and the subsidiary. Note that the existence of a 
controlling shareholder does not necessarily imply the existence of either PLA or SMA.   
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Indeed, in Germany as well as the UK, but not the USA, the corporate tax liability is 
based on the earnings of the individual companies in the group. Hence, the amount 
transferred to the parent company is not a dividend as such, but rather the result from 
the effort to reduce the tax liability of the parent company. Second, the financial 
statements for firms with such agreements often do not provide any information on 
their profit and, instead, disclose the amount (which may be positive or negative) that 
is transferred to the parent company as well as the dividend per share paid to the 
minority shareholders of the controlled company. One way of dealing with this data 
issue is to use consolidated accounts. If the parent firm is publicly quoted, the 
transfers from the quoted subsidiary to its parent company will be reflected in the 
parent firm’s financial statements, and therefore these subsidiaries will be included, 
albeit indirectly, in our sample. This is one reason why consolidated accounts are used 
in this study. 
The other reason why we use consolidated accounts is that in practice the dividend 
policy of the parent company is determined by considering the annual consolidated 
accounts. However, a problem arises from working with consolidated accounts as we 
have 14 sample firms that are owned by other corporations which in turn are also in 
our sample. Hence, there is some degree of double-counting in our data sample which 
may bias our estimations. However, the size of these 14 firms is usually very small 
compared to their parent companies and the bias created by the double counting is 
therefore unlikely to be severe. A typical example is Renk AG, which is owned by 
MAN AG during our sample period. The average market capitalization of Renk AG is 
8 per cent of the market capitalization of the average sample firm, and only 3 per cent 
of the market capitalization of MAN AG (which is 3 times as large as the average 
listed firm).  
To measure earnings, we use cash flow – defined as zero distribution profits gross of 
depreciation and changes in provisions – divided by the number of shares outstanding 
(including both ordinary and preference shares) at the end of the accounting year.
8 
Our use of cash flow rather than published earnings is in line with Andres et al. (2009) 
                                                 
8 Behm and Zimmermann (1993) use ‘net profits’, a figure that is suggested by the German Financial 
Analysts Association (DFA). However, data on net profits are not available for all firms in our sample 
and, in any case, the figure is only reported if it is not negative.   
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who find that dividends of German firms move in line with the former, but not the 
latter. Indeed, published earnings are subject to smoothing. 
We gather information on all the disclosed holdings of voting shares over the period 
of 1984 to 2005 from Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. Large shareholders 
controlling at least 25 per cent of the voting rights are classified into the following 
eight categories: families or individuals, banks, industrial or commercial corporations, 
insurance companies, local and federal government authorities, foreign investors, 
industrial or financial holding companies, and foundations (Stiftungen). As previously 
mentioned, an important feature of the German system of corporate governance is the 
complexity of control structures.
9 Quoted firms can be controlled by other 
corporations and these, in turn, can be controlled by e.g. families or individuals, 
banks, local or federal government authorities, or be widely held companies.  
According to Franks and Mayer (2001), one of the main features of the German 
capital market is the extensive use of complex shareholding structures such as 
pyramids of ownership (see Figure 1).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To account for the complexity of control structures in Germany, we collect data on 
first-tier control as well as ultimate control. In Figure 1, at the first tier the controlling 
shareholder of stock-exchange listed corporation A is corporation B. In turn, 
corporation B is controlled by corporation C. As corporation C does not have a 
controlling shareholder, control over corporation A ultimately resides with 
corporation C. To complete the shareholder data from Saling/Hoppenstedt 
Aktienführer, we also use Commerzbank - Wer gehört zu Wem, a guide that is 
published every three years and which contains data on the shareholder structure of 
roughly 11,000 of the larger German firms, i.e. those with equity capital of at least € 
0.51 million (DM 1 million). This guide is particularly useful in cases where 
companies at intermediate layers are privately held, and are therefore not covered by 
Saling/Hoppenstedt Aktienführer. If there is no shareholder holding at least 25 per 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Boehmer (2002), Becht and Boehmer (2001) and Franks and Mayer (2001). Franks et al. (2009) report 
such complex control structures not only in Germany, but also France and Italy.  
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cent of the voting shares of A, then A is said to be widely held. Conversely, the 
ultimate controlling shareholder of a firm in our sample is said to be at the first tier if 
the first-tier shareholder is a bank or insurance company, local or federal government 
authorities, a foreign investor or a family. In all other cases, the ultimate shareholder 
is located at a higher tier which is reached when one of these two criteria is satisfied 
or when we find a corporation which is widely held. If we reach such a widely held 
firm at a specific layer, we state that ultimate control lies with this corporation (and at 
this layer). Figure 1 illustrates this point: we consider corporation C to be the ultimate 
shareholder of corporation A. We can then claim that company C controls firm A 
through a pyramid.  
It is important to note that this procedure differs markedly from that of Faccio et al. 
(2001) and Faccio and Lang (2002) in that we trace the ultimate controlling 
shareholder of a firm even if one of the firms in the control chain is unlisted. 
Conversely, both Faccio et al. (2001) and Faccio and Lang (2002) assume that all 
unlisted firms in the control chain are family controlled, which may lead to 
misclassifications. We thus agree with Franks et al. (2009, p.5) ‘that an analysis of 
ultimate ownership of listed firms must take into account the true ownership 
structures of private firms that are involved in controlling these listed firms’. 
3.3 Measures of control 
We measure both first-tier control and ultimate control. We also use two different 
types of measures of control. The first type consists of three measures of the 
concentration of control. First, we consider the proportion of voting shares owned by 
the largest shareholder at the first or ultimate level of firm i at time t-1 (L1i,t-1). A 
shareholder is considered to be the largest shareholder if he has the highest percentage 
of voting rights and owns at least 25 per cent of the votes. This shareholder may or 
may not be on the management board (Vorstand) or supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
of the firm. In the overwhelming majority of listed German firms, the large 
shareholder sits on at least one of the two boards. By law, at least fifty per cent of the 
supervisory board seats, including that of the chairman, are reserved for the 
shareholder representatives. Goergen (1998) analyses the management and 
supervisory board representation of 51 firms whose main shareholder at the time of  
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going public is a family. He finds that members of the controlling family hold on 
average 17 per cent of the shareholder seats on the supervisory board and almost half 
of the seats on the management board. Further, in 27.5 per cent of the companies, 
members of the family sit on both boards and in 88 per cent of the companies the 
family chairs at least one of the two boards. Gerum, Steinmann and Fees (1988) and 
Franks and Mayer (2001) find similar patterns. Second, we use the Herfindahl index 
(H i,t-1) based on all the disclosed stakes of voting shares at the first or ultimate level 
of firm i at time t-1 as a measure of the concentration of control.
10 However, there is a 
data issue relating to the calculation of this index for the years preceding 1995. 
Indeed, shareholders did not have to disclose shareholdings below 25 per cent until 
1995 when the disclosure threshold was reduced to 5 per cent (“Zweites 
Finanzförderungsgesetz”). Therefore, the Herfindahl index may be a noisy measure of 
the concentration of control before 1995. However, although the disclosure threshold 
before 1995 was 25 per cent, there was voluntary disclosure of some of the stakes 
which fell below that threshold. Bearing in mind that our aim is to measure control, it 
is highly unlikely for a shareholder to exercise any degree of control over his firm 
while managing to remain unknown to the firm and the general public. However, as a 
robustness check we also recalculate our Herfindahl index across the entire period of 
study by ignoring any stakes below 25 per cent. We find that our results are not 
affected by the exclusion of these stakes. Third, we use two dummy variables, WH1 i,t-
1 and WH2 i,t-1, that equal one if there is no large shareholder of firm i at time t-1  
holding at least 25 or 50 per cent of the votes, respectively, at the first or ultimate 
level.  
The second type of measure of control takes into account the type of large shareholder 
(i.e. banks, families and other corporations).
11 Bi,t-1 takes the value of the proportion of 
votes held by the bank, if a bank is the largest shareholder of firm i at time t-1 with at 
least 25 per cent of the voting shares, and is zero otherwise. Fi,t-1 and ICi,t-1 are the 
                                                 
10 The index is defined as 
2
ij
j
H s  where sij is the stake of voting shares held by shareholder j in firm i. 
11 As mentioned above, we exclude firms that are controlled by foreign investors from the regression analysis since 
it is not possible to determine the tax status for each foreign investor in our sample firms.  
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equivalent variables measuring the percentage of votes held by families and 
corporations, respectively.
12  
4. Descriptive data analysis 
4.1 Control 
Table 3 reports first-tier control as well as ultimate control for the sample firms for 
every fourth year over the period of 1984 to 2004. Both first-tier and ultimate control 
are measured in two alternative ways: first as stakes exceeding 25 per cent of the 
votes and, second, as majority stakes.  
There are at least three important lessons to be learnt from Table 3. First, there is a 
noticeable difference between the most important types of shareholder when first-tier 
control is considered and when ultimate control is considered. For example, the first 
three panels, Panels A, B and C, which report control for 1984, 1988 and 1992, 
respectively, suggest that at the first tier families, industrial and commercial firms and 
holding firms are the three most important types of shareholder, each holding a 
blocking minority in roughly a fifth of the sample firms. When first-tier control is 
defined as majority control, holding companies lose somewhat in importance, but they 
are still among the three most important types of shareholder during 1984-1992. 
However when the focus is on ultimate rather than first-tier control, families are by far 
the most important type of shareholder and the other two types are dwarfed in 
comparison. The increase in the importance of families as controlling shareholders 
when control is measured at the ultimate tier suggests that families frequently hold 
control indirectly – via intermediate holding companies or other industrial and 
commercial companies – rather than directly. However, it would be over-simplistic to 
assume that all unlisted holding companies and other industrial and commercial 
companies are ultimately family controlled. Indeed, as e.g. Panel A suggests some of 
the other types of shareholder also exercise control indirectly. One such type of 
shareholder is banks. If control is measured at the ultimate level control by banks 
increases by a factor of 1.2 (for 2000) and 2 (for 2004).  
                                                 
12 The results do not change substantially when we use the proportion of the voting shares held by each type of 
shareholder when they are the largest shareholders, irrespective of whether they hold more than 25% of the voting 
rights or not.  
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Second, while the importance of families as controlling shareholders remains constant 
over the entire period of 1984 to 2004, the importance of other types of controlling 
shareholder changes significantly. Types that lose in importance are local and federal 
government authorities as well as banks which have been traditionally associated with 
the German system of corporate governance. When control is measured at the ultimate 
level local and federal government authorities and banks have control over 12% and 
16% of the sample, respectively, in 1984. However, these percentages are reduced to 
less than one per cent and less than 2 per cent in 2004. Dittmann et al. (2010) find a 
similar decrease in bank control over time. The main cause for this decline is a change 
in capital gains taxation in 2002 which reduced the tax liability caused by the sale of 
stakes in other companies. In addition, the German government started a privatization 
programme in the 1990s, reducing its stakes in public companies (in particular in 
utility companies such as RWE, VEBA, and BEWAG). Conversely, foreign investors 
have rapidly increased in importance as controlling shareholders, holding a majority 
of the votes (a blocking minority) in about 7 per cent (9 per cent) of the sample at the 
start of the period and 17 per cent (21 per cent) at the end of the period.  
Third, there is also evidence that the percentage of widely held firms increased over 
the period. However, given the selection criterion for our sample firms (firms had to 
be listed in 1989) this increase may be entirely due to the increase in the size of the 
firms during the period of study. Hence, it is difficult to draw any generally valid 
conclusions from this pattern. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2 Dividends and control 
Tables 4 and 5 show the average cash flow per share, dividend per share and dividend 
payout ratio for firms with stable control over the period of study and for those with a 
control change, respectively.
13 Table 4 defines firms with stable control as those that 
do not experience a change in their ultimate shareholder holding at least 25% of the 
                                                 
13 Tables 4 and 5 focus on a smaller range of types of large shareholder than Table 3 given that there 
are too few observations for the omitted types of large shareholder.  
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votes during 1984-2005. The table is based on the 133 firms out of the 220 that satisfy 
this criterion. Firms that stay widely held during the entire period have both the 
highest average cash flow per share and dividend per share. However, their dividend 
payout ratio is the second lowest, after that of bank-controlled firms. Firms controlled 
by families and other companies have the highest payout ratios. Table 4 suggests two 
important points. First, given that widely held firms have the second lowest payout 
ratio dividends do not seem to be a substitute for large-shareholder monitoring. 
Second, the type of large shareholder matters as dividend payout ratios differ 
substantially across the various types of shareholder. All in all, Table 4 fails to 
provide support for hypothesis H1. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 focuses on the 56 firms that experience a change of control during 1986-2003. 
The period of 1986-2003 is chosen in order to have at least two years of data before 
and after the year of the control change. Twenty-two firms experience more than one 
change in control, resulting in a total of 78 observations.
14 The table reports the 
average dividend per share and cash flow per share as well as the payout ratio for 
firms changing from widely held to closely held and those that experience the exact 
opposite change in control. Thirty-seven firms experience the former change in 
control whereas 41 firms experience the latter. There is no evidence suggesting that 
dividend policy changes substantially over the five years around the change in control 
for both types of control changes. However, when the type of the new (or past) 
controlling shareholder is taken into consideration there is some evidence that firms 
that are originally widely held and then become controlled by a family increase their 
dividend and cash flow per share as well as their dividend payout ratio. Conversely, 
firms that experience the exact opposite change in control decrease their dividend 
payout ratio. Further, firms that are initially widely held and then become controlled 
by a bank reduce their dividend payout ratio whereas those that experience the exact 
opposite change in control increase their dividend payout ratio. Hence similar to Table 
                                                 
14 For those firms that have more than two changes in control, none of the changes in control after the 
second one renders the minimum of two years of data after the change. Hence, these changes have been 
excluded from Table 5.  
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4, Table 5 does not provide support for hypothesis H1 and suggests that the type of 
controlling shareholder is important when considering the dividend payout.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Dividend model 
In our empirical analysis, we extend the seminal dividend model by Lintner (1956). 
Based on interviews with chief financial officers (CFOs) of 28 large US companies, 
Lintner provides some of the earliest, path breaking evidence on the determinants of 
dividend payouts. Although he discovers considerable differences in dividend policy 
across companies, he also finds the following four common patterns. First, CFOs have 
in mind a long-term target payout ratio when setting their firm’s dividend. Second, 
they tend to focus on dividend changes rather than dividend levels. Third, a change in 
dividends is usually caused by a major, unexpected and persistent change in earnings. 
Finally, dividends are sticky, i.e. they only change if the CFO perceives that there is a 
long-term change in earnings warranting this change. 
Based on the above patterns, Lintner (1956) develops his model of corporate dividend 
behaviour, the so called partial adjustment model. For any year t, the target level of 
dividends, D
*
it for firm i, is a proportion of current earnings, Eit, in line with the long-
term payout ratio ri: 
  it i it E r D  *  (5) 
In any given year the firm will only partially adjust towards the target dividend level. 
Hence, we have: 
  it t i it i i t i it u D D c a D D        ) ( 1 ,
*
1 ,  (6) 
where ai is a constant; ci is the speed at which dividends adjust to changes in earnings, 
with 0  ci  1; and DD D it i t it   ,1  is the actual change in the dividend compared to 
the desired change which is  1 ,
*
  t i it D D .  
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If ai = 0 and ci = 1, then actual dividends adjust immediately and fully to any change 
in earnings and the actual dividend will always coincide with the firm’s target 
dividend. At the other extreme, if ci = 0, then dividends follow a random walk. The 
pattern uncovered by Lintner that firms gradually adjust dividends in response to 
changes in earnings and thus apply dividend smoothing implies that the speed-of-
adjustment coefficient ci is within the ]0; 1[ range. Furthermore, a positive ai 
represents the management’s resistance towards dividend cuts. Substituting equation 
(6) into (5) then yields the following equation: 
  it t i i it i i it u D c E b a D      1 , ) 1 (  (7) 
where ri = bi  / ci is the payout ratio and ci the speed-of-adjustment coefficient. 
Fama and Babiak (1968) extend the partial adjustment model by including a lagged 
earnings variable. They assume that the process generating the annual earnings of firm 
i is as follows 
  EE v it i i t it     () , 1 1   (8) 
where vit is a serially uncorrelated error term. A further assumption is that there is full 
adjustment of dividends to the expected earnings change iEi,t-1, and partial 
adjustment to the remainder: 
    it t i i i t i t i i it i i i t i it u E r D E E r c a D D            1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ) (    (9) 
which rearranged gives the following equation 
  it t i i it i t i i i it u E d E b D c a D         1 , 1 , ) 1 (  (10) 
where bi = ci ri , and di = ri i (1 ci). 
As pointed out above, several research papers have documented that dividend 
payments are not only determined by past dividends, earnings and cash flows, but also 
by other factors. In particular, a firm’s major shareholder may have an influence on 
the dividend payout. More precisely, as discussed above, the large shareholder’s 
appetite for dividends will depend on his tax status. Hence, equation (10) needs to be 
augmented by a variable measuring the firm’s control structure. Furthermore, Andres 
et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence that German firms base their long-term  
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payout ratio on cash flows rather than published earnings. Hence, our basic, 
empirically testable, model is as follows: 
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 (11) 
where Dit stands for the total dividend payment for firm i at time t,  represents total 
cash flow, Ci,t-1 is a measure of control at time t-1, MVEit is the market capitalization 
of firm i at the beginning of each year, YEAR stands for a vector of time dummies, i 
is the firm-specific effects and Vit is the disturbance term.  
As stated in Section 3.3, we use two different types of measures of control. The first 
type consists of three measures of the concentration of control. First, L1 i,t-1 is the 
proportion of votes held by the ultimate, controlling shareholder of firm i at time t-1  
(again, the threshold of 25% applies). Second, H i,t-1 is the Herfindahl index for all 
disclosed shareholdings of firm i at time t-1. Third, WH1 i,t-1 and WH2 i,t-1 are two 
dummy variables, which are set to one if there is no shareholder holding at least 25% 
and 50% of the votes of firm i at time t-1., respectively. Finally, we also use a second 
type of measure which accounts for the type of large shareholder. In detail, Bi,t-1 takes 
the value of the proportion of votes held by the bank, if a bank is the largest 
shareholder of firm i at time t-1 with at least 25 per cent of the voting shares, and is 
zero otherwise. Fi,t-1 and ICi,t-1 are the equivalent variables measuring the proportion 
of votes held by families and corporations, respectively. 
5.2 Estimation technique 
In the regression analysis we use ordinary least squares in levels (OLS) as well as the 
generalised method of moments as a system of equations in levels (with lagged 
differences of the dependent and the independent variables as instruments) and 
equations in first differences (with lagged levels of the dependent and independent 
variables as instruments) (GMM-in-system). If dynamic panel data models such as 
equation (11) are estimated over a large cross-section of firms and a comparatively 
small number of time periods, there is a potential estimation problem caused by the 
correlation of the explanatory variables with the firm-specific effects, i. Thus, if we  
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estimate equation (11) using OLS, the estimators are likely to be inconsistent and 
biased. Since the Within-Groups estimator, i.e. the estimator obtained from applying 
OLS on the equation with each observation expressed as the deviation from the time 
mean, will still be inconsistent and biased, we use an instrumental variable approach 
as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate 
equation (11). This approach consists of estimating a system of first-differenced and 
levels equations that offers significant efficiency gains in situations where a simple 
GMM estimator in first differences performs poorly. The resulting linear estimator 
uses the lagged differences in the dependent and independent variables as instruments 
for the equations in levels, in addition to the lagged levels of the dependent and 
independent variables as instruments for the equations in first differences. 
Specifically, it uses lagged differences of the dependent and explanatory variables, 
(e.g. Di,t-1  – Di,t-2)  as additional instruments in the levels equations, under the 
assumption that these differences are uncorrelated with the firm-specific effects, i, 
even though the levels of these are correlated with i. We call this technique GMM-
in-system.  
6. Regression analysis 
Out of the sample of 220 firms, described in Section 3.1, we exclude firm-year 
observations relating to control by foreign companies, by local and federal 
government authorities and by foundations. While the former type of large 
shareholder is excluded due to the difficulty of determining the tax status of individual 
foreign shareholders, the latter two types are excluded due to the small number of 
observations. This leaves us with a total of 3,264 firm-year observations covering 214 
firms that are controlled by a family, bank or another corporation or are widely held. 
6.1 Concentration of control 
Table 6 shows the results from the estimation of the regression model based on 
equation (11). The table reports the results for both the OLS in levels and the GMM-
in-system estimation. There is no evidence, neither from the OLS regression 
(specification (1)) nor from the GMM-in-system regression (specification (2)), that 
large shareholders have any impact on dividend policy. There is also no evidence that  
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the degree of control concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index, has any 
impact on the dividend payout ratio (specifications (3) and (4)). Finally, there is also 
no evidence that the lack of a controlling shareholder has any impact on dividend 
policy (specifications (5), (6), (7) and (8)). This implies that there is no empirical 
support for hypothesis H1. There is also no relationship between control and dividend 
policy when we allow for this relationship to take on a non-linear form (specifications 
(9) and (10)). We therefore cannot confirm our hypothesis H2.  
It should be noted that the lack of results is hardly surprising given the patterns 
suggested by the univariate statistics presented above. While some types of large 
shareholder (in particular banks) are associated with comparatively low levels of 
dividend payouts, others (most notably families) seem to follow a policy of high 
payouts. The variables used so far do not distinguish between the different types of 
controlling shareholders and are therefore not able to capture these very different 
payout policies. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6.2 Type of controlling shareholder 
Table 7 is similar to Table 6 as it is also based on equation (11). However, control is 
now measured by taking into account the type of the ultimate controlling shareholder 
in addition to the concentration of control. In detail, we account for three different 
types of controlling shareholder. The first type we account for is families: F takes the 
value of the proportion of votes held by the family, when a family is the largest 
shareholder of firm i at time t holding at least 25 per cent of the voting shares (at the 
ultimate level), and is zero otherwise. The second one is the equivalent measure for 
banks and the third one is the equivalent measure for other industrial or commercial 
firms.  
While Table 6 does not suggest a relationship between dividends and the 
concentration of control, Table 7 suggests that there is such a relationship when the 
type of ultimate controlling shareholder is taken into account. Indeed, there is strong  
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evidence that firms controlled by families have a higher dividend payout than firms 
controlled by other types of shareholder and widely held firms. This result confirms 
the conclusions drawn from Table 3 and provides support for hypothesis H3. Outside 
investors seem to demand higher dividend payouts as protection against expropriation 
by the controlling family. As an alternative interpretation, our findings are consistent 
with the idea that families pay themselves higher dividends because their portfolios 
are generally not well diversified. They therefore seem to be dependent on their 
primary asset as a source of income.  
However, there is no evidence that firms that are controlled by other firms have a 
particular dividend policy. This calls for the rejection of hypothesis H4, which states 
that firms controlled by other firms pay higher dividends than firms controlled by 
other types of large shareholder. Finally, while the OLS regressions suggest that 
banks pay lower dividends, the GMM-in-system regressions do not confirm that there 
is such a relationship. We thus find only weak support for hypothesis H5. Still, this 
result lends some support to Edwards and Fischer (1994) who argue that German 
banks are not very active in monitoring the management of their investee firms. 
 [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6.3 Tax status of controlling shareholder 
Table 8 focuses on the controlling shareholder’s tax preference for dividends. The 
first specification includes the dividend tax discrimination variable, but does not 
adjust for the presence of and the level of control held by a particular type of 
shareholder (i.e. families, banks or industrial and commercial corporations).
15 The 
dividend tax discrimination variable is negative and significant. This implies that the 
higher the tax advantage of dividends, the lower is the dividend paid out by the firm. 
This seemingly contradictory finding may be a direct result of the effects of different 
types of shareholder on the dividend payout reported above: control by banks is 
associated with lower dividends (although bank control is only partly significant) even 
                                                 
15 As specified in Section 4.3., we use the aggregate weighted average tax rate for firms that are widely 
held.  
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though banks (and corporations more generally) have a strong tax preference for 
dividends prior to 2001. In contrast, family control is associated with significantly 
higher dividend payments even though one would expect the exact opposite pattern 
given the tax status for families. In other words, specification (1) erroneously assumes 
that the tax variable is the only determinant of dividends. If we add the percentage of 
votes held by the type of controlling shareholder at the first tier (specification (2)), the 
tax discrimination variable is no longer statistically significant. Similarly, when 
control is measured at the ultimate tier, we find that the tax discrimination variable is 
now positive and not statistically significant (specification (3)). The results further 
confirm that control at the ultimate level should be considered when analysing the 
impact of controlling shareholders on firms’ payout policy. When family control is 
measured at the ultimate level, the coefficient is again statistically significant, but falls 
short of being significant if control is measured at the first tier. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In sum, the evidence provided in our analysis does not support the argument that the 
tax status of the controlling shareholder influences dividend policy in Germany. In 
other words, controlling shareholders do not seem to impose their tax preferences on 
minority shareholders. In addition, we find that controlling families, despite a strong 
tax disadvantage of dividends, are associated with significantly higher dividend 
payouts. Hence, hypotheses H6 and H7 are not supported. Given the danger of 
minority shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders (e.g. Connelly et al. 
2010), families seem to use dividends as a device to signal to outside shareholders that 
they are willing to forego their private benefits of control. Higher dividend payouts 
are also beneficial to minority shareholders from a tax perspective as individuals 
whose marginal income tax rate is lower than the corporate tax rate on retained 
earnings (which is equal to the highest income tax rate for large parts of the sample 
period) prefer dividends over capital gains (see section 4.3). In conclusion, our 
findings suggest that dividend payouts of German firms are not influenced by tax but 
by control and/or governance considerations.  
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has studied the dividend behaviour of 220 industrial and commercial 
German firms over 1984-2005. Theory predicts a link between the concentration of 
control and dividend policy. Indeed, Easterbrook (1984) and Rozeff (1982) predict 
that dividends play an important role in firms with no large shareholder and no or 
little managerial ownership. This suggests a linear and decreasing effect of the 
concentration of control on the dividend payout. In contrast, Schooley and Barney 
(1994) suggest that there is a convex relationship between the concentration of control 
and the dividend payout. At low levels of ownership and control dividends are 
important in terms of realigning the interests of the managers with those of the 
shareholders. The role of dividends decreases at intermediate levels of ownership and 
control. It then becomes again important as ownership and control become highly 
concentrated and there is a clear danger of the large shareholder expropriating the 
minority shareholders. However, we fail to find evidence in favour of both a linear 
link and a non-linear link.  
In contrast, when we account for the type of controlling shareholder, we find a link 
between control and the dividend payout. Indeed, firms controlled by families have 
significantly higher dividend payouts and firms controlled by banks have significantly 
lower dividend payouts than all other firms.  
However, we do not find that the tax status of the controlling shareholder has any 
impact on the dividend decision. While families and individuals had a clear preference 
for capital gains over dividends for the entire period, family-controlled firms paid 
significantly higher dividends that all other firms. 
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Figure 1: Example of a ‘pyramid’ structure. Firm A is one of the firms in our sample. At the first-tier 
of the pyramid, it is controlled by firm B (which holds 25 per cent of its voting shares), which can be a 
quoted or unquoted firm. At the next layer, we find that firm B is controlled by firm C (which holds 25 
per cent of its voting shares), which again can be quoted or unquoted, but is in this case widely held. 
Ultimately, firm C controls firm A.  
  
  A 
(Quoted firm) 
  Widely held 
  B 
(Quoted or unquoted firm) 
  C 
(Quoted or unquoted firm) 
25% 
25% 
25%  
  29
Table 1 
Corporation Tax Rates on Retentions and Dividends, Tax Rates on  
Personal Income and Solidarity Surcharge in Germany 
  Retentions 
1  Distributions  Top Income 
Tax Rates
2 
Solidarity 
Surcharge 
1977–1989  56%  36% 56% 0% 
1990  50%  36% 53% 0% 
1991-1992  50%  36% 53% 3.75% 
1993-1994  45%  36% 53% 0% 
1995-1997  45%  30% 53% 7.5% 
1998  45%  30% 53% 5.5% 
1999  40%  30% 53% 5.5% 
2000  40%  30% 51% 5.5% 
2001-2003
3  25%  25% 48.5% 5.5% 
2004  25%  25% 45% 5.5% 
2005  25%  25% 42% 5.5% 
 
1 Because of tax exemptions and reductions, the tax charge for part of the profit may vary from 0 to 50 per 
cent between 1990 and 2000. It is therefore necessary to differentiate retained profits and reserves according 
to the rate of tax that they incur, because when they are distributed they must bear a uniform tax rate of 36 per 
cent (prior to 1995) or 30 per cent (between 1995 and 2000). When the firm distributes profits which have 
already been taxed at the tax rate applying to retained profits, it can claim a reduction in its current tax bill or 
even a tax refund. For example, until December 1993, by distributing profits that had been retained before 
1990, firms could receive a tax refund of 6 per cent. As a consequence, a few companies that had 
accumulated comfortable levels of reserves before 1990 have paid extra dividends during this period.  
2 Until 1990, personal income of more than DM 130,000 was subject to the highest tax rate. From 1991 until 
1999, personal income exceeding DM 120,000 was taxed at the highest tax rate. Between 1999 and 2004, the 
threshold was gradually lowered to DM 102,000. 
3 In 2001, Germany underwent a major tax reform. Under the new taxation laws, distributed and retained 
earnings are no longer taxed at different rates. 
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Table 2 
Overall Sample Composition 
Panel A
Sample Period  1984-2005 
Number of Firms 220 
Number of Firm-Year 
Observations 
 
3932 
Panel B
Number of Firms  Number of Records per 
Firm
74 22 
14 21 
15 20 
12 19 
16 18 
22 17 
12 16 
14 15 
5 14 
3 13 
1 12 
12 11 
7 10 
1 9 
7 8 
1 7 
3 6 
1 5 
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Table 3 
First-Tier and Ultimate Control of 220 German Industrial and Commercial  
Quoted Firms in 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 
Widely held firms are firms without a shareholder controlling at least 25 (50) per cent of the voting shares. 
Data for closely held firms are reported according to the type of their largest shareholder. The sample size 
varies over the 20-year period as some firms in our sample are not quoted during the earlier part of the period 
of study and others delist later on as they go private or bankrupt. 
  First-Tier Control Ultimate Level Control
  25% 50% 25% 50%
  %  No. % No. % No.  %  No.
  Panel A: 1984
A. Widely held  18.1 32 54.2 96 18.1 32 54.2  96 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
         
1. Family  21.5 38 14.1 25 32.8 58 18.1  32 
2. Indust./commerc. firm 22.0 39 16.4 29  6.2  11 10.7  19 
3. State  2.8 5 1.7 3  11.9  21  4.0  7 
4. Bank  11.3 20  1.1  2  15.7 28  1.7  3 
5. Insurer  1.1 2  0  0 2.3 4  0  0 
6. Foreign investor  5.7 10 4.5  8  8.5 15 7.3  13 
7. Holding company  16.9  30 7.3 13 2.8  5  2.3  4 
8. Foundation  0.6 1 0.6 1 1.7 3 1.7  3 
Total  100 177 100 177 100 177 100  177 
  Panel B: 1988
A. Widely held  19.3 42 49.5  108  19.3 42 49.5  108 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
         
1. Family  22.0 48 16.6 36 34.8 76 23.8  52 
2. Indust./commerc. firm 18.8 41 14.2 31  5.4  12  8.7  19 
3. State  3.2 7 1.8 4  10.1  22  3.7  8 
4. Bank  7.8 17 0.9  2 13.8  30 1.4  3 
5. Insurer  0.0 0  0  0 1.4 3  0  0 
6. Foreign investor  5.0 11 3.7  8  9.2 20 6.9  15 
7. Holding company  22.5 49 11.9 26  2.8  6  3.2  7 
8. Foundation  1.4 3 1.4 3 3.2 7 2.8  6 
Total  100 218 100 218 100 218 100  218 
  Panel C: 1992
A. Widely held  17.3 37 43.9 94 17.3 37 43.9  94 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
         
1. Family  19.7 42 14.5 31 35.5 76 23.4  50 
2. Indust./commerc. firm 22.4 48 16.8 36  9.4  20 10.7  23 
3. State  2.4 5 1.9 4 9.8  21  3.7  8 
4. Bank  7.0 15 1.9  4 10.3  22 1.9  4 
5. Insurer  0.9 2  0  0 2.3 5  0  0 
6. Foreign investor  5.1 11 5.6 12  10.3  22 9.8  21 
7. Holding company  24.3 52 14.5 31  3.2  7  4.7  10 
8. Foundation  0.9 2 0.9 2 1.9 4 1.9  4 
Total  100 214 100 214 100 214 100  214  
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  First-Tier Control Ultimate Level Control
  25% 50% 25% 50%
  %  No. % No. % No.  %  No.
  Panel D: 1996
A. Widely held  20.0 37 42.2 78 20.0 37 42.2  78 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
         
1. Family  13.0 24  7.6  14 31.9 59 19.5  36 
2. Indust./commerc. firm 18.3 34 15.7 29  5.4  10  8.6  16 
3. State  2.2 4 0.5 1  10.8  20  1.1  2 
4. Bank  4.3 8 2.2 4 9.1  17  2.7  5 
5. Insurer  1.1 2 0.0 0 1.7 3 0.0  0 
6. Foreign investor  8.6 16 8.1 15  15.2  28  14.6  27 
7. Holding company  31.4 58 23.2 43  3.2  6  9.1  17 
8. Foundation  1.1 2 0.5 1 2.7 5 2.2  4 
Total  100 185 100 185 100 185 100  185 
  Panel E: 2000
A. Widely held  17.2 27 39.5 62 17.2 27 39.5  62 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
         
1. Family  12.1 19  6.4  10 34.4 54 19.1  30 
2. Indust./commerc. firm 17.2 27 16.0 25  6.4  10  8.9  14 
3. State  1.9 3 0.6 1 5.7 9 1.3  2 
4. Bank  5.7 9 2.5 4 7.0  11  2.5  4 
5. Insurer  0.6 1 0.0 0 2.5 4 0.6  1 
6. Foreign investor  12.8 20 12.1 19 20.4 32 18.5  29 
7. Holding company  31.9 50 22.3 35  4.5  7  7.7  12 
8. Foundation  0.6 1 0.6 1 1.9 3 1.9  3 
Total  100 157 100 157 100 157 100  157 
  Panel F: 2004
A. Widely held  25.7 28 43.1 47 25.7 28 43.1  47 
B. Closely held, the largest 
shareholder being: 
         
1. Family  14.7 16  7.4  8  34.0 37 24.8  27 
2. Indust./commerc. firm 5.5 6 5.5 6 6.4 7 6.4  7 
3. State  0.0 0 0.0 0 0.9 1 0.0  0 
4. Bank  0.9 1 0.0 0 1.8 2 0.9  1 
5. Insurer  0.9 1 0.0 0 0.9 1 0.0  0 
6. Foreign investor  17.4 19 11.9 13 21.1 23 16.5  18 
7. Holding company  31.2 34 28.4 31  5.5  6  4.6  5 
8. Foundation  3.7 4 3.7 4 3.7 4 3.7  4 
Total  100 109 100 109 100 109 100  109 
 
 
   
  33
Table 4 
Dividend Payout Ratios of Firms With Stable Control Over the Period 1984-2005 
 
Cash flows are defined as zero distribution profits gross of depreciation and changes in long-term provisions. 
Dividends are gross of tax on distributed earnings. Of the original sample of 220 German industrial and commercial 
firms, 133 were either ultimately controlled by a family, another industrial corporation, the state, a bank, or widely 
held (no large shareholder controlling more than 25% of the voting rights), over at least 10 consecutive years during 
the sample period 1984 to 2005. We report two different dividend payout ratios. The first one is the ratio of the 
average gross dividend across all firms over the whole period 1984-2005 over the average cash flow for all firms 
over the whole period 1984-2005. The second one is (shown in parentheses) the average of all (individual) firms’ 
dividend payout ratios defined as gross dividends divided by cash flows.
 
Type of Control: 
Average
Cash Flow Per 
Share (DM)
Average Gross 
Dividend Per 
Share (DM)
Dividend Payout 
Ratio (%) 
No. of 
Firms 
Widely held firms  100.45 14.66  14.57  (17.08)  28 
Family-controlled 79.73  14.41  18.07  (23.38)  63 
Company-controlled firms  66.56  12.88  19.36 (21.81)  9 
State-controlled firms  76.06  13.32  17.51 (21.62)  18 
Bank-controlled firms  94.71  10.92  11.53 (11.91)  14 
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Table 5 
Dividend Payout Ratios Around the Year of Control Changes 
 
Widely held firms are firms without a large shareholder controlling at least 25 per cent the voting shares. Control 
is measured at the ultimate level. The table is based on the 56 firms with a change in control during 1986-2003. 
The period was chosen in order to have at least two years of data before and after the year of the change in 
control. There are 22 firms that experience two changes in control, resulting in a total of 78 control changes. 
Cash flows (CF) are defined as zero distribution profits gross of depreciation and changes in long-term 
provisions. Dividends (Div) are gross of tax on distributed earnings. Dividend payout ratios (Div/CF) are defined 
as the average dividend expressed as a percentage of the average cash flow across all 56 firms. The event year, 
t=0, is the year of the change in control. 
   Nature of Control Change:
 
 
Year 
  Widely 
held 
becomes 
Closely 
held 
Closely 
held 
becomes 
Widely 
held 
Widely held
becomes 
Family-
controlled 
Family-
controlled 
becomes 
Widely held 
Widely held 
becomes 
Bank-
controlled 
Bank-
controlled 
becomes 
Widely held 
-2  Div  10.5  8.7  7.9 7.2 12.6  13.5
  CF  60.8  65.5  46.4 33.8 66.2  123.5
  Div/CF  17.2  13.3  16.9 21.3 19.0  11.0
              
-1  Div  11.2  9.9  9.4 7.7 10.3  15.1
  CF  60.2  52.8  55.9 29.6 68.8  123.3
  Div/CF  18.6  18.8  16.8 26.2 14.9  12.2
              
0  Div  9.5 9.4  9.0 7.3 11.7  14.8
  CF  51.7  68.9  45.0 40.2 78.1  123.5
  Div/CF  18.4  13.6  20.1 18.0 15.0  12.0
              
1  Div  11.5  10.4  12.2 8.0 9.9  18.9
  CF  79.6  74.9  79.9 46.7 108.0  107.1
  Div/CF  14.5  13.9  15.2 17.2 9.1  17.6
              
2  Div  13.0  9.5  13.7 7.5 11.5  16.7
  CF  77.9  73.3  76.2 52.1 126.6  105.5
  Div/CF  16.7  12.9  18.0 14.4 9.1  15.8
No. of Firms  37 41  13 17 5  10
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Table 6 
Panel Data Estimation of the Relation Between Dividends, Cash Flows  
and Different Measures of Control  
 
The sample size is 214 firms and is obtained by excluding firms from the original sample of 220 firms that are subsidiaries of 
foreign companies, state-controlled or controlled by foundations throughout the whole sample period. Dit is the dependent 
variable in the specifications and is total dividends scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the year. CF is total 
cash flows scaled by the same variable. Li is the proportion of voting shares held by the largest shareholder at the ultimate level. 
H is the Herfindahl index of all the disclosed shareholdings. WH1 and WH2 are dummy variables which equal one if there is no 
large shareholder with at least 25 and 50 per cent the voting shares, respectively. Time dummies are included in all models. m1 
and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan is a test for the validity of the instruments, asymptotically distributed as 
2 
under the null of valid instruments. Specifications (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) are GMM-instrumental variable estimators based on a 
GMM-in-system procedure, which consists of a linear system of first-differenced and levels equations. The set of instruments 
used are levels of dividends and cash flows variables dated t-1 to t-4 in the differenced equations, and first-differences dated t-2 in 
the levels equations throughout all specifications. Moreover, the specifications use levels of control variables dated t-1 to t-3 for 
the differenced equations and levels of control variables dated t-1 in the levels equations. Standard-errors, asymptotically robust 
to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  (a)  (b)  (c) (d)  (e)
  OLS  GMM OLS  GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM  OLS GMM
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10)
Const.  0.003
 
(0.010) 
-0.000
(0.012)
0.004
 
(0.009) 
-0.001
(0.008)
0.005
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.008)
0.006
(0.008)
-0.005 
(0.010) 
0.002
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.012)
Di,t-1  0.168
** 
(0.067) 
0.101
***
(0.026)
0.167
** 
(0.066) 
0.100
***
(0.026)
0.168
**
(0.067)
0.101
***
(0.026)
0.167
**
(0.066)
0.098
*** 
(0.027) 
0.167
**
(0.067)
0.102
***
(0.026)
CFit  0.111
*** 
(0.041) 
0.118
**
(0.047)
0.110
*** 
(0.041) 
0.118
**
(0.047)
0.110
***
(0.041)
0.118
**
(0.047)
0.111
***
(0.041)
0.119
** 
(0.047) 
0.110
***
(0.041)
0.119
**
(0.047)
CFi,t-1  -0.034
** 
(0.017) 
-0.022
**
(0.011)
-0.034
** 
(0.017) 
-0.022
**
(0.011)
-0.034
**
(0.017)
-0.022
**
(0.011)
-0.033
**
(0.016)
-0.021
** 
(0.011) 
-0.034
**
(0.017)
-0.023
**
(0.011)
Li,t-1  0.003 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.011)
-  - - - - -  0.015
(0.009)
0.041 
(0.029)
Li,t-1
2  -  -  -  - - - - -  -0.012
(0.008)
-0.038
(0.029)
Hi,t-1  -  -  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000
(0.000)
- - - -  - -
WH1i,t-1  -  -  -  - -0.001
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.007)
- -  - -
WH2i,t-1  -  -  -  - -   -0.004
(0.004)
-0.001 
(0.001) 
- -
m1  0.401  -1.99 0.377  -1.99 0.429 -2.00 0.425 -1.99  0.423 -1.99
m2  1.084  -0.59 1.061  -0.61 1.127 -0.60 1.124 -0.66  1.094 -0.59
Sargan 
(p-values) 
-  182.12
(0.19)
-  186.34
(0.13)
- 187.99
(0.12)
- 180.90 
(0.20) 
- 192.03
(0.46)
No. of 
Observations 
 
3264 
 
3264
 
3264 
 
3264
 
3264
 
3264
 
3264
 
3264 
 
3264
 
3264
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Table 7 
Panel Data Estimation of the Relation Between Dividends, Cash Flows and Control by Banks, 
Families, and Corporations 
 
Dit is the dependent variable in all the specifications. Di,t-1, Li,t-1, L
2
i,t-1 and CF are defined as in Table 6. Fi,t-1 is the proportion 
of voting shares held by a family, when a family is the largest shareholder of the firm at the ultimate level at time t-1, and 
equals zero otherwise. Bi,t-1 and ICi,t-1 are similarly defined, but relate to the case when the largest shareholder is a bank and 
another corporation, respectively. Time dummies are included in all the specifications. m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Sargan test is a test for the validity of the instruments, asymptotically distributed as 
2 under the null of valid 
instruments. Specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) are GMM-instrumental variable estimators based on a GMM(SYS) procedure 
which consists of a linear system of first-differenced and levels equations. The set of instruments used are levels of dividends, 
cash flows, bank control, family control, control by industrial corporations, and proportion of voting shares held by the largest 
shareholder dated t-1 to t-4 for the differenced equations. For dividends and cash flows the instrument set is first-differences 
dated t-1 in the levels equations. For bank control, family control, control by industrial corporations, and the proportion of 
voting shares held by the largest shareholder the instrument set is dated t-2 to t-5 in the levels equations. Standard-errors, 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
 ***, 
** and 
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (a)  (b) (c) (d)
  OLS  GMM  OLS GMM OLS GMM  OLS  GMM
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)
Const.  0.004
 
(0.009) 
-0.002
 
(0.007) 
0.003
(0.009) 
-0.003
(0.007) 
0.003
(0.010) 
-0.005
 
(0.012) 
0.002
 
(0.010) 
-0.004
(0.011) 
Di,t-1  0.165
** 
(0.066) 
0.101
*** 
(0.025) 
0.166
**
(0.066) 
0.098
***
(0.025) 
0.166
**
(0.066) 
0.102
*** 
(0.025) 
0.164
** 
(0.066) 
0.103
***
(0.025) 
CFit  0.110
*** 
(0.041) 
0.117
** 
(0.046) 
0.110
***
(0.041) 
0.117
**
(0.046) 
0.110
***
(0.041) 
0.117
** 
(0.047) 
0.110
*** 
(0.041) 
0.117
**
(0.046) 
CFi,t-1  -0.034
** 
(0.017) 
-0.023
* 
(0.012) 
-0.034
**
(0.017) 
-0.022
* 
(0.012) 
-0.034
**
(0.017) 
-0.023
** 
(0.012) 
-0.034
** 
(0.017) 
-0.023
* 
(0.012) 
Bi,t-1  -0.010
*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004
 
(0.009) 
- - - -  -0.010
** 
(0.005) 
-0.007
(0.010) 
ICi,t-1  -0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
- - - -  -0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Fi,t-1  0.006
* 
(0.003) 
0.020
** 
(0.009) 
0.008
*** 
(0.003) 
0.020
** 
(0.009) 
0.008
*** 
(0.003) 
0.019
* 
(0.010) 
0.005
* 
(0.003) 
0.018
* 
(0.010) 
Li,t-1  - - - -  0.006 
(0.009) 
0.023 
(0.033) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.023 
(0.032) 
L
2
i,t-1  - - - -  -0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.023 
(0.029) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.025 
(0.028) 
m1  0.354 -1.96 0.396 -1.97 0.421 -1.96 0.416  -1.97 
m2  1.074 -0.54 1.103 -0.58 1.116 -0.47 1.112  -0.44 
Sargan 
(p-value) 
- 197.47 
(0.995) 
- 198.73 
(0.248) 
- 194.59 
(0.998) 
 200.05 
(1.00) 
No. of 
Observations 
 
3264 
 
3264 
 
3264 
 
3264 
 
3264 
 
3264 
 
3264 
 
3264 
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Table 8 
Panel Data Estimations of the Relation Between, Dividends, Cash Flows, Tax Discrimination and 
Control Structures at the First-Tier Level 
 
The sample size is 214 firms. Dit is the dependent variable in all models and CF is cash flows, both scaled by the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the year. TAXi,t is a tax discrimination variable (see Section 4.3 for details about its 
calculation). FNPi,t-1 (Fi,t-1), BNPi,t-1 (Bi,t-1), and ICNPi,t-1 (ICi,t-1) are first-tier (ultimate) control (as a percentage) by 
domestic families, banks, and industrial and commercial corporations, respectively. Specification (1) estimates the 
impact of the tax status of shareholders in Germany on the dividend policy. Specifications (2) and (3) contain controls at 
the first-tier (2) and ultimate control (3) as additional explanatory variables. Time dummies are included in all 
specifications. m 1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan is a test for the validity of the 
instruments, asymptotically distributed as 
2 under the null of valid instruments. All specifications are estimated using 
GMM(SYS) which consists of a linear system of first-differenced and levels equations. The set of instruments used are 
levels of dividends and cash flows dated t-2 and first-differences dated t-1 to t-4. For the control variables FNPi,t-1, 
BNPi,t-1, and ICNPi,t-1, the set of instruments is levels dated t-2 to t-5, and first-differences dated t-2. For the tax variable, 
the instruments are levels dated t-2 to t-5, and first-differences dated t-1. Standard-errors, asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
 ***, 
** and 
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
Constant  0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.002
(0.009)
-0.001 
(0.008) 
Di,t-1  0.097
*** 
(0.027) 
0.101
***
(0.026)
0.097
*** 
(0.026) 
CFit  0.119
** 
(0.047) 
0.118
**
(0.047)
0.119
**
(0.046) 
CFi,t-1  -0.022
** 
(0.011) 
-0.023
**
(0.011)
-0.023
* 
(0.012) 
BNPi,t-1  -  0.001
(0.018)
 
Bi,t-1     -0.003 
(0.010) 
FNPi,t-1  -  0.013
(0.013)
 
Fi,t-1     0.014
* 
(0.008) 
ICNPi,t-1  -  -0.004
(0.007)
 
ICi,t-1     0.004 
(0.008) 
TAXi,t  -0.011
* 
(0.006) 
-0.004
(0.006)
0.003 
(0.007) 
m1   -2.00  -2.00 -1.97 
m2  -0.65  -0.43 -0.53 
Sargan (p-values)  201.46 (0.98) 182.70 (0.99) 196.31 (0.99) 
No. of Observations  3264  3264 3264 
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